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10 Introduction
11 Most people agree that inflicting unnecessary suf-
12 fering upon animals is wrong.Many fewer people,
13 including among ethicists, agree that painlessly
14 killing animals is necessarily wrong. The most
15 commonly cited reason is that death (without
16 pain, fear, distress) is not bad for them in a way
17 that matters morally or not as significantly as it
18 does for persons, who are self-conscious, make
19 long-term plans, and have preferences about their
20 own future. Animals, at least those that are not
21 persons, lack a morally significant interest in con-
22 tinuing to live. At the same time, some argue that
23 existence itself can be good, insofar as one’s life is
24 worth living. For animals, a good life can offset a
25 quick, if early, death. So, it seems to follow that
26 breeding happy animals that will be (prematurely)
27 killed can be a good thing overall. Insofar as
28slaughter and sale makes it economically sustain-
29able to raise new ones, who would otherwise not
30exist, raising and killing animals for food who will
31have lives worth living is good overall. It benefits
32them as well as consumers and makes the world
33better by adding to the sum of happiness. The
34process of raising and killing animals with posi-
35tive welfare produces a sequence of replacement
36that maintains or increases overall welfare, all else
37being equal (assuming in particular no overall
38negative impact on the welfare of other parties).
39Call this the replaceability argument (RA) and the
40ensuing controversy the replaceability problem
41(RP). This is a problem at the crossroads of the
42ethics of killing, agricultural ethics, procreation
43ethics, and population ethics. Peter Singer gave
44the idea its most precise and controversial formu-
45lation in Practical Ethics (2011: Chapter 5), first
46published in 1979.
47History of the Problem
48In 1789, in the Introduction to the Principles of
49Morals and Legislation, Bentham (1907) wrote:
50If the being eaten were all, there is very good reason
51why we should be suffered to eat such of them
52[animals] as we like to eat: we are the better for it,
53and they are never the worse. They have none of
54those long-protracted anticipations of future misery
55which we have. The death they suffer in our hands
56commonly is, and always may be, a speedier, and by
57that means a less painful one, than that which would
58await them in the inevitable course of nature.. . .
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59 [W]e should be the worse for their living, and they
60 are never the worse for being dead. But is there any
61 reason why we should be suffered to torment them?
62 Not any that I can see. Are there any why we should
63 not be suffered to torment them? Yes, several.
64 Bentham went on to formulate his oft-quoted
65 criterion for equal consideration:
66 It may come one day to be recognized, that the
67 number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the
68 termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally
69 insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the
70 same fate. What else is it that should trace the
71 insuperable line? . . . the question is not, Can they
72 reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?
73 (Bentham 1907: XVII.1)
74 Bentham, the founder of classical utilitarian-
75 ism, appears to endorse a version of RA: pain-
76 lessly killing animals makes everyone better off
77 than they would otherwise be – it does not harm
78 them –meat eaters are better for it. Given the more
79 sophisticated cognition of mature human beings,
80 killing them requires stronger justifications,
81 although Bentham believed the main reason
82 against murder lied in the terror (foreclosed to
83 animals) it would induce in other people.
84 Early animal rights advocate Henry Salt,
85 despite Bentham’s influence, called RA “the
86 logic of the larder” (1914). Salt was responding
87 to the essayist Leslie Stephen’s (1896) argument
88 against vegetarianism:
89 Of all the arguments for Vegetarianism none is so
90 weak as the argument from humanity. The pig has a
91 stronger interest than anyone in the demand for
92 bacon. If all the world were Jewish, there would
93 be no pigs at all.
94 Salt took Stephen’s remark to be premised on a
95 fallacy:
96 It is often said, as an excuse for the slaughter of
97 animals, that it is better for them to live and to be
98 butchered than not to live at all. Now, obviously, if
99 such reasoning justifies the practice of flesh-eating,
100 it must equally justify all breeding of animals for
101 profit or pastime, when their life is a fairly happy
102 one. . . . In fact . . . there is hardly any treatment that
103 cannot be justified by the supposed terms of such a
104 contract. Also, the argument must apply to man-
105 kind. . . .The fallacy lies in the confusion of thought
106 which attempts to compare existence with
107 non-existence. A person who is already in existence
108 may feel that he would rather have lived than not,
109 but he must first have the terra firma of existence to
110argue from; the moment he begins to argue as if
111from the abyss of the non-existent, he talks non-
112sense, by predicating good or evil, happiness or
113unhappiness, of that of which we can predicate
114nothing. (Salt 1914: 221–222)
115Peter Singer, in the first edition of Animal
116Liberation (1975: Chapter 6), agreed with Salt.
117He changed his view while writing Practical
118Ethics (first published in 1979, revised in 1993
119and 2011), influenced by ingenious arguments put
120forward in the late 1970s by Derek Parfit about
121impersonal wrongs and the widely discussed
122“nonidentity problem” (1984: 351–374). Based
123on the fictional case of two prospective mothers
124and medical programs (367), Parfit showed that
125one could act wrongly without harming anyone in
126particular. Despite a plausible asymmetry
127between harms and benefits, and the fact that
128parents are under no obligation to bring to life a
129child whose existence will very likely be happy,
130one needs to explain why it is wrong to bring a
131miserable being into existence (even one who
132would otherwise not exist) yet not equally good
133to bring a happy being into existence. “Sound
134explanations for this,” Singer and Mason wrote,
135“are extraordinarily difficult to find” (2006: 252).
136It may be at most “morally neutral” (optional), but
137it is at least good.
138Structure of the Argument
139In its basic form, RA states that one can increase
140or maximize value in the world (happiness, plea-
141sure, preference satisfaction, objective list) by
142increasing the number of happy or fulfilled sen-
143tient beings. Applied to farming, it states that
144humanely raised animals (HRAs) that live pleas-
145ant lives and can be killed without pain and dis-
146tress can be replaced, without loss, by new HRAs,
147which thus offset the good prevented by the kill-
148ing. Humanely raising and killing animals bene-
149fits animals, consumers, and the world.
150There are twoways to interpret the offsetting of
151an early death by a good life: either animals are
152personally better off with a happy, if short life,
153than with no life at all or, even if the personal harm
154of death is not offset by the benefit of existence,
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155 the impersonal marginal benefit “for the world”
156 offsets the total sum of personal harms. Each
157 interpretation requires different arguments: either
158 to the effect that death does not significantly harm
159 animals (so the net sum of personal benefits minus
160 harms for the individual is positive) or that imper-
161 sonal benefits may override personal harms
162 (so the overall sum of benefits minus harms, for
163 all affected, is positive). Either way, one has to
164 show that the total benefits of eating meat out-
165 weigh the costs to animals (McMahan 2008).
166 Contemporary Applications
167 In the context of intensified industrialized farm-
168 ing, critiques and alternative methods have
169 flourished. A popular trend in animal husbandry,
170 espoused by food writers, celebrity farmers, and
171 academics, focuses on the possibility of eating
172 better and treating animals better – in part by
173 eating fewer of them. “Conscientious,” “ethical,”
174 or “compassionate” omnivores embrace the
175 humane, pasture-based, grass-fed, and, often-
176 times, organic and local production of meat as a
177 sustainable solution in the ailments of the modern
178 Western diet. Humane husbandry and a conscien-
179 tious omnivore diet minimize environmental dam-
180 age, animal suffering, and public health issues
181 while preserving a (culturally, aesthetically, and
182 economically) worthwhile practice. Animals, in
183 exchange for life and care, offer us their own
184 life. Ethically produced meat ideally comes from
185 free-ranging animals who enjoyed (slightly)
186 extended life spans (allowing animals to live
187 their expected natural life span would dramati-
188 cally increase market prices), increased outdoor
189 access, environmental enrichment, a more natural
190 diet (grass, organic cereals, fruits, vegetables,
191 roots), and social relations. Contemporary practi-
192 tioners and/or advocates include Hugh Fearnley-
193 Whittingstall (2004), Nicolette Niman, Joel
194 Salatin (Polyface Farms), Michael Pollan (2006),
195 and Allan Savory, among others.
196 There is another purported benefit of hus-
197 bandry to animals. Its end would not only deprive
198 billions of future individuals of a good life, it
199 would ultimately mean phasing out entire
200domesticated species and breeds. Thus, Pollan
201writes, chickens “depend for their well-being on
202the existence of their human predators. Not the
203individual chicken, perhaps, but Chicken – the
204species. The surest way to achieve the extinction
205of the species would be to grant chickens a right to
206life.” (2006: 322). This is assuming, controver-
207sially, that limited populations of such breeds or
208species would not thrive in the wild or sanctuaries.
209This is also suggesting, again controversially, that
210these kinds have intrinsic value and lack wild
211counterparts. Moreover, RA only applies to
212those individuals and kinds that would not exist
213otherwise, hence, for instance, not to wild-caught
214fish or independently reproducing game. Finally,
215any given type of agriculture will affect the num-
216ber, species, and well-being of the animals that
217will exist on the land used or converted (Matheny
218and Chan 2005). There is also a widespread
219assumption that domestication is an advantageous
220bargain for animals, insofar as husbandry pro-
221vides for their needs, food, shelter, veterinary
222care, and protection against predators and diseases
223and ensures the reproductive success of the popu-
224lation (Budiansky 1999; Pollan 2006), but as sec-
225tion “Philosophical Controversy” shows, such
226comparisons involve complicated metaphysical
227questions.
228In the actual world, RA strikes more directly at
229veganism than ovo-lacto-vegetarianism, since
230producing dairy, eggs, and other animal
231by-products cannot be dissociated from killing,
232in part because the profitability of livestock
233depends on the marketability of by-products and
234because male calves and chicks and spent females
235are not useful to the industry. Critics, on the other
236hand, point out that, even granting its validity, the
237logic of the larder does not entail that such prac-
238tices will be morally acceptable. RA entails, at
239best, that one could hypothetically have reasons
240to eat animals – with meat probably becoming a
241luxury good (McMahan 2008). But further obsta-
242cles stand in the way of even heirloom husbandry:
243the unreliability of labels; inevitability of slaugh-
244terhouses for animals raised for commercial pur-
245poses; limitations of mobile slaughter units and
246gruesomeness of “backyard butchers”
247(McWilliams 2015); reduced life spans; mother-
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248 offspring separation; castration, clipping,
249 docking, and other mutilations; increased mortal-
250 ity and morbidity rates; and environmental con-
251 cerns (waste, GHG emissions, land and water
252 use), let alone empirical and ethical uncertain
253 ties regarding the badness of death for real and
254 hypothetical HRAs (Višak and Garner 2016).
255 Singer and Mason (2006) note: “[humanely
256 raised] cattle, like all the animals we eat, died
257 while still very young. They might have lived
258 several more years before meeting one of these
259 other forms of death, years in which they matured,
260 experienced sexual intercourse, and, if they were
261 females, cared for their children” (253). There-
262 fore, even without granting animals a right to
263 life, RA does not settle by itself the permissibility
264 of the current humane omnivore diet.
265 Philosophical Controversy
266 Philosophers accepting RA (e.g., Hare 1999;
267 Scruton 2004; Singer 2011; Varner 2012) assume
268 at least a version of these two claims: death is not a
269 significant harm to nonperson animals; existence
270 is better than nonexistence (for HRAs, other sen-
271 tient beings, and/or from the point of view of the
272 universe). Singer and Varner also accept that these
273 may be matters of degree.
274 Hare, Singer’s mentor at Oxford, considered
275 Stephen’s comparison very sensible: “happy
276 existing people are certainly glad they exist, and
277 so are presumably comparing their existence with
278 a possible non-existence” (1999: 239). IfAu2 he were
279 to choose between the life of a trout in a small
280 farm in the English countryside, Hare would
281 certainly “prefer the life, all told, of such a fish,
282 to that of almost any fish in the wild, and to
283 non-existence” (240).
284 Singer (2011: Chapter 5) now accepts that a
285 good if short life is better than nonexistence. Sen-
286 tient life even has a preference-independent
287 (objective) value, such that more good lives are
288 better than either a less happy or a non-sentient
289 universe. These claims are even easier for Singer
290 to accept now that he espouses hedonistic
291 act-utilitarianism (Lazari-Radek and Singer
292 2014): the permissibility of a given act of killing
293depends on the overall resulting balance of enjoy-
294ment and suffering. On this view, persons are also
295replaceable, although, given the richness of their
296lives and the numerous side effects, not as easily
297as merely sentient beings (also see Varner 2012).
298Distinctions
299At the crux of RP stand unresolved questions in
300moral theory, applied ethics, and axiology (Višak
301and Garner 2016): When is death a harm? What is
302the relevant point of comparison to assess
303(momentary or lifetime) welfare? How does a
304short happy life compare with nonexistence, life
305in the wild, or a longer life? Each comparison has
306its own complications, including nonidentity
307problems between wild and domesticated ani-
308mals, different generations, and different life
309stages of individuals.
310The theoretical application of RA to nonperson
311animals, but not to persons (self-conscious, ratio-
312nal, and autonomous), hinges on the assumption
313that death is normally distinctively bad for the
314latter if their lives are worth living. Death can be
315a tragedy only for persons. RA thus rests on two
316central distinctions: suffering versus death and
317persons versus nonpersons, which may explain
318why many people opposing animal suffering do
319not necessarily oppose the killing of animals for
320food, and why people who would consider killing
321human beings, including anencephalic children,
322for horrific medical research generally accept
323experimenting on at least as sentient nonhumans.
324Non-speciesists substitute persons/nonpersons for
325humans/nonhumans, since some nonhumans can
326be persons (e.g., great apes and cetaceans) and not
327all humans are persons (e.g., fetuses and anence-
328phalic children). Even a non-speciesist can there-
329fore deny that the death of a cow and the death of a
330normal human being are on a par, given their
331different cognitive capacities (Bentham 1907;
332Singer 2011; Varner 2012).
333Metaphysical Issues
334Utilitarian versions of RA depend on the crucial
335assumption that the interests of nonexisting
336beings matter – not simply those of beings that
337do exist or will exist (regardless of one’s choices)
338but also those of beings who would exist if one
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339 chose to bring them into existence (i.e., whose
340 existence and identity depend on one’s choices).
341 The question is whether the interests of already
342 conceived future children matter like those of
343 merely possible children. If interests count only
344 once one has determined that a being will exist, it
345 is problematic to balance the interests of possible
346 farm animals against their interests if they exist.
347 Critics of RA say one ought to ensure existing
348 animals are made as happy as possible when they
349 are alive but ought not to make as many happy
350 beings as possible (Višak 2013).
351 RA proponents can press that acknowledging
352 that existence can be good implies that existence
353 can be better than nonexistence (benefit) and
354 hence that nonexistence can be worse (harm).
355 RA opponents insist that nonexisting beings
356 have no welfare so there is no one for whom
357 existing is better than never existing. Existence,
358 on this view, is an absolute, i.e., non-comparative,
359 benefit. Secondly, accepting that existing beings
360 can prefer their existence to nonexistence does not
361 commit one to accept that merely possible beings
362 would prefer a short happy life to no life at all. In
363 fact, preferring existence to never existing may as
364 well count against killing (no longer existing). It
365 is an open question whether absolute benefits can
366 compensate for harms such as death, but it is
367 plausible that happy animals, if they were in a
368 position to assess such benefits and harms,
369 would prefer life to death. They would, moreover,
370 not be swayed by the fact that, had one not
371 planned to kill them, they would not exist, since
372 existence is not a comparative benefit.
373 Utilitarianism
374 Hare (1999: 239–239) makes a clear utilitarian
375 case for replaceability:
376 doing wrong to animals must involve harming
377 them. If there is no harm, there is no wrong. Further,
378 it has to be harm overall; if a course of action
379 involves some harms but greater benefits, and
380 there is no alternative with a greater balance of
381 good over harm, it will not be wrong. We have to
382 ask, therefore, whether the entire process of raising
383 animals and then killing them to eat causes them
384 more harm overall than benefit. My answer is that,
385 assuming, as we must assume if we are to keep the
386 “killing” argument distinct from the “suffering”
387argument, that they are happy while they live, it
388does not. For it is better for an animal to have a
389happy life, even if it is a short one, than no life at all.
390Although, existence is not “a benefit in itself,”
391“it is a necessary condition for having the benefits
392that we can have only if we are alive” (239).
393Existence can be compared (and preferred) to
394nonexistence and existence allows for more pref-
395erences to be satisfied. Hare endorses total
396(as opposed to average and person-affecting)
397utilitarianism – i.e., we ought to “maximize the
398total amount of preference-satisfaction that is had
399in the world . . . and distribute it impartially.”
400Painlessly killing animals, as opposed to making
401them suffer, does not frustrate their preferences.
402Assuming there are no uncompensated negative
403side effects, the permissibility of killing thus
404depends on “how many live animals, of different
405species including the human, we ought to cause
406there to be” or, more accurately, the number of
407quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) (239). Hare
408concludes that traditional “organic” husbandry
409(replaceability), especially in parts of the world
410where growing crops is impractical, is
411optimific. Note that Hare’s argument is stronger
412than Singer’s theoretical endorsement of
413replaceability. It states not only that replacing
414animals is permissible, but that it is required
415when optimific. Lazari-Radek and Singer (2014)
416have recently come closer to such a view
417(hedonism aside).
418As is clear, RA follows naturally from certain
419versions of utilitarianism. In fact, Pollan’s (2006)
420defense of meat, besides its empirical and axio-
421logical assumptions (predation as symbiosis; spe-
422cies matter more than individuals), echoes
423utilitarian commitments (Singer and Mason
4242006: 252). Replaceability is, indeed, a crucial
425ground for deontological and rights-based objec-
426tions to utilitarianism, insofar as the latter sees
427individuals as replaceable “receptacles of value”
428(pleasurable experiences) (Regan 1983). Yet,
429while RA squares well with utilitarianism,
430rejecting its conclusion need not entail rejecting
431utilitarianism.
432Further distinctions are necessary here. There
433are personal and impersonal values, which can be
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434 ranked differently. A state of affair can be imper-
435 sonally good independently of its goodness-for-
436 particular beings, from what Sidgwick called “the
437 point of view of the universe.” The existence of
438 more happy animals might be impersonally better
439 even if it were better for no one in particular. On
440 the other hand, states of affairs can be personally
441 better or worse for those existing in such states.
442 Happy/long lives are better for cows than short/
443 miserable lives. So, a state of affairs could be
444 personally worse than its alternatives while
445 being impersonally better: e.g., replaceability is
446 worse for cows, who live shorter lives than they
447 could and are not better off for existing, but the
448 world is better in virtue of containing more hap-
449 piness than a world of irreplaceable cows.
450 On total impersonal utilitarianism, impartiality
451 requires that one weighs the interests of actual
452 (present and future) beings and possible beings
453 equally, in proportion to their strength rather than
454 whose interests they are. But several authors
455 emphasize the compatibility of prior-existence/
456 person-affecting utilitarianism (let alone rule con-
457 sequentialism) with the irreplaceability of persons
458 or of all sentient beings. They assume, as men-
459 tioned earlier, that nonexisting animals have no
460 welfare, so they cannot be harmed or benefitted by
461 existence or nonexistence. The interests of possi-
462 ble beings thus do not matter as much, if at all, as
463 those of actual beings (Sapontzis 1987; Višak
464 2013; cf. Parfit’s 1984 and Singer’s 2011 [1979,
465 1993] discussion). These views thus reject a cen-
466 tral tenet of RA.
467 Both person-affecting and impersonal views
468 may have bullets to bite. The former are hard-
469 pressed to account for the intrinsic wrongness of
470 breeding animals that will undergo lives of suffer-
471 ing, if one cannot be harmed by being brought into
472 existence. Of course, once one exists, it is wrong
473 to be made to suffer. But one lacks direct reasons,
474 on the person-affecting view, to avoid breeding
475 animals that will have miserable lives as a result of
476 genetic defects or induced disabilities.
477 Wide-person-affecting views, however, offer
478 interesting resources (Višak 2013). On the other
479 hand, purely impersonal views cannot easily
480 account for the intrinsic wrongness of killing and
481 involve comparisons between states of affairs that
482are not straightforwardly meaningful from the
483point of view of those they affect. They can accept
484that not breeding conscious animals has neutral
485(neither positive nor negative) value. But they
486cannot make a difference between the good that
487is achieved by prolonging an existing being’s life
488and creating beings that would not otherwise have
489existed. Moreover, hedonistic impersonal utilitar-
490ians lack resources to account for the distinctive
491wrongness of killing persons except in terms of
492their side effects on other parties and the relative
493richness of their future lives, all of which can be
494compensated for on such views. Singer’s chang-
495ing views over the editions of Practical Ethics are
496representative of these difficulties. His recent shift
497from preference utilitarianism to hedonism
498deprives him of his previous arguments for the
499irreplaceability of persons.
500To conclude, RP thus leaves us with the theo-
501retical challenge of providing a compelling case
502for the replaceability of nonpersons that does not
503apply to persons. Most authors either accept
504replaceability for both persons and nonpersons
505(Lazari-Radek and Singer 2014; Varner 2012) or
506deny it for both (Višak 2013). Further, practically,
507RP does not settle all of the morally relevant
508aspects of animal husbandry. The best defense of
509conscientious omnivores rests on several empiri-
510cal and philosophical assumptions still being
511hotly debated (McWilliams 2015; Višak and Gar-
512ner 2016).
513Conclusion
514Controversies Au3regarding the ethics of animal hus-
515bandry and eating meat sometimes revolve around
516the idea of replaceability, namely, that killing cer-
517tain animals can be permissible insofar as they
518live pleasant lives and are replaced by new ani-
519mals with equally pleasant lives. The controver-
520sies touch upon foundational issues in moral
521theory, practical ethics, as well as contemporary
522discussions of “ethical,” “conscientious,” or
523“humane” omnivores.
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